Values are back in vogue in the heady world of commerce. One-Tel, Pan Pharmaceuticals, HIH, AWB, all challenge our assumptions about corporate values. One definition sees Values as 'the principals and fundamental convictions which act as general guides to behaviour, the standards by which actions are judged as good or desirable.' In short, values are the day-to-day basis for organisational action. For good or for ill, we express our values by what we do in everyday life, in our approach to leadership and in our interactions with peers and colleagues. In exploring issues such as integrity and trust with clients, I've found the following scenario neatly encapsulates some of the underlying dilemmas entangled in values based leadership.
Werner von Braun was an engineering prodigy who had headed up the German rocket program which ultimately produced Hitler's V.2 vengeance weapon. In the final days of World War 2, the Americans and Soviets put moral qualms aside and engaged in a frantic race to sweep up as many advanced weapons programs and key scientific and engineering staff as possible. One of the V.2's key assembly facilities was located at Camp Dora in the Harz Mountains in central Germany. Thousands of concentration camp inmates were worked to death there in horrific conditions. In 1947-8 Camp Dora was investigated for suspected War Crimes. After the war, the US covertly brought members of von Braun's V.2 team to the United States where they went to work for the US Army. Many eventually took out US citizenship, swearing the oath of allegiance en masse in the Huntsville High School near the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville Alabama on 14 April 1955. Huntsville showed its appreciation by saluting the German scientists and their families with a special dinner .
In February 1955, a top-level Technologies Capabilities Panel set up by President Eisenhower which had been examining the emerging Soviet missile threat recommended the development of a reconnaissance satellite to monitor Soviet activity. The Advisory Committee cautioned that America should first launch a civilian satellite to establish a 'freedom of space' precedent - the right for satellites to overfly foreign countries. The coming International Geophysical Year planned for 1957 would provide perfect cover for this development program. A US satellite equipped with instruments to measure radition in the upper atmosphere would both contribute to scientific study and underline American prestige. Moreover, the Soviets were also known to be developing a satellite. Instead of working collaboratively, the US Army, Navy and Air Force would each pitch competing proposals.
The Air Force planned to use their SM-65 Atlas intercontinental missile. It was the most powerful US rocket yet built with a range of 5,000 miles, yet its advanced design suffered technical teething problems. The Navy's Vanguard proposal also had problems. The Vanguard was a three-stage rocket which had yet to be built, based on the RTV-N-12a Viking rocket. Its Viking first stage had successfully taken the first photographs of the earth from space. However, the Vanguard would have to be ready in 2 years. No one had previously achieved such an aggressive time to launch schedule. The Army's proposal used the 'old reliable' Redstone, a derivative of the SSM-A-14 rocket. Its booster and guidance system had already been successfully tested. However, the Atlas and Redstone ballistic missiles were top-priority military projects, which were not to be slowed in the pursuit of secondary space missions. Never-the-less, von Braun was convinced he had the most plausable bid.
In August 1955 the Committee on Special Capabilities was ready to vote on which of the competing Army, Navy or Air Force teams would win the opportunity to put the first US satellite into space. At stake for the winning team was not just tremendous prestige, but millions in funding over coming years. Factions in the US Navy and Air Force were concerned at the dominant role the US Army was seeking in space. Some committee members voiced concernes at the idea of launching the first American satellite using German engineers - and a modified vengence weapon. Consequently, the Navy's Vanguard rocket was selected and von Braun was specificially banned from further work on his proposed satellite launch vehicle. Unfortunately for the US, the Vanguard proved a disappointing failure, achieveing only three successful launches out of nine attempts.
Early on 4 October 1957, a Soviet R-7 rocket lifted off from its launch pad in the Baikonur Cosmodrome complex. As the satellite passed overhead on its first orbit, an insistent 'beep, beep, beep' was heard around thw world, announcing the arrival of Sputnik. The Soviets had beaten the US into space. von Braun however would go on to international glory as the father of the Saturn 5 rocket which carried man to the moon.
So, did the Committee on Special Capabilities arrive at the right decision? What is the role of ethics and values in these decisions? What part did inter-service rivalry and self-interest play in the Committee's deliberations? Was it a case of military priorities over riding opportunities for advancing civilian science? Should pragmatism have overridden national pride?